The coverless text steganography has become a research hotspot in the field of information hiding because no modification to a text carrier will improve the concealment of steganography. However, compared with images, audios, videos, or other carriers, a plain text has less redundancy for modification, so the text steganographic embedding rate is usually lower, and semantic anomalies are more easily produced once it is modified or generated. This paper analyzes the parity of Chinese characters' stroke number and its statistical characteristic, and reach the conclusion that this parity feature exhibits a uniform distribution and it exists in every character. These indicate that the parity can be employed to express a binary digit and its combination can represent a binary digit string. In the light of the above analyses, we propose a new coverless plain text steganography based on the parity of Chinese characters' stroke number and extend it to further improve the embedding rate. By exploiting the space mapping concept, this method initializes a binary search tree based on the texts from the Internet and searches the corresponding texts according to the secret binary digit string generated from a secret. Thus, a secret will be mapped into a list of the corresponding uniform resource locators. That is, our proposed methods only employ the existing uniform resource locators to convey a secret. Compared with the existing text steganography techniques, our methods not only have high-embedding rate and good concealment but also can improve the embedding capacity without impact on the concealment, which eliminates the contradiction between the embedding capacity/rate and security, because no modification or additional information is generated. In addition, these methods have a prominent search success rate, and they can be extended to other language features as well as to other languages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information privacy, electronic copyright protection, and other security issues compel people to pay much attention to information hiding technologies [1] - [3] . As one of its branches, steganography is to hide the very existence of a secret message in the clandestine communication. As an effectively complementary technology to Cryptography, steganography has drawn tremendous attention of researchers [4] , [5] , [9] . To get better concealment, the medium for a carrier needs to be widely used. A text is used in various scenarios, such as WWW, SMS, e-mail, instant messaging, and other services, so it is the most popular medium, which conforms to the popularity feature of the best steganography carriers [4] . It is pertinent to mention here that a plain text
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is a lightweight medium and has no enough redundant space to hide a secret in comparison to other different carriers or mediums that include images [5] , [6] , videos [7] , audios [8] , and etc. Nowadays, text steganography is a meaningful and challenging research topic.
Zhang et al. [9] divided the steganography methods into two categories: steganography by cover modification and steganography by no cover modification. Most of the existing text steganography methods fall into the former, which includes the format transformation, the semantic substitution and so on. Lee and Chen [10] introduced a text steganography by modifying text colour codes in an HTML file. A steganography method is proposed based on the changes of the layout format in word document [11] . In another works [12] , [13] , the text steganography is implemented by using the wrong spellings of words. Similarly, Shirali-Shahreza and Shirali-Shahreza [14] hid a secret VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ message using the spelling differences between American English and British English. In [15] , [16] , a watermark is added in a text by modifying the structure of the sentence. The text steganography can also be implemented by using the semantic substitutions as shown in [17] , [18] . For human perception, these methods have good concealment since one is not sensitive to these subtle modifications. However, such cover modification of steganography has a fatal flaw that it can be easily detected by contrasting the stego-text with the cover text by a computer, and even more, the secret message could be extracted. In addition, some distortion will be produced inevitably when a carrier was modified [19] , [20] . Such an abnormality might be detected by the statistical detection even if the attacker does not get the original carrier. Thus, the coverless text steganography get more attention, which falls into the category of steganography by no cover modification stated earlier [21] . It can be further divided into two categories: text steganography by generation and text steganography by search. Text steganography by generation usually uses the natural language grammar, N-grams or other language models to generate a new text as stego-text [22] - [24] . This method only generates a stego-text, and does not perform any modification to a carrier. Hence, there is no corresponding carrier. In view of these facts, this method can effectively resist the attacks by comparison. Moreover, the statistical features in a generated stego-text usually are not abnormal. But abnormal semantics or poor readability may exist when a long natural language text is generated [25] , which result in easy detection. Yang et al. [29] build a RNN-Stega model to generate the steganographic text for a secret bitstream. It outperforms all the previous related methods, but in some cases, still more than 10% generated texts might be screened out.
Text steganography by search is a relatively new approach, which finds one or more appropriate texts as the carriers in the big data environment [21] , [26] . It differs from text steganography by cover modification because no alternation will be performed on a text. Moreover, it also differs from steganography by generation because cover texts actually exist. In recent years, text steganography by search is a research hotspot in the field of steganography. Chen et al. [21] discovered the cover texts for steganography by using the mathematical expression of Chinese characters; Shi et al. [26] described a steganography method by searching webpages on the Internet. Both the aforementioned methods, i.e., [21] and [26] , have certain issues, such that no appropriated text might be found in case of [21] , and some additional location information will be produced in case of [26] .
To overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings of steganography by search, a new coverless plain text steganography is proposed based on characters' features in this paper. Our main idea is to find a ubiquitous feature of characters to represent a binary digit (i.e., ''0'' or ''1''), and establish a mapping function between the character features and a Binary Digit String (BDS). Next, appropriate texts are found for steganography based on the mapping function from the Internet. In this paper, the Parity of Chinese Characters' Stroke Number (PCCSN) is taken as a character feature to illustrate the idea. The analyses and experiments show that our proposed methods have several advantages over the existing methods in several aspects, i.e., generation of no additional information, better concealment, good extensibility, and high embedding rate.
II. TEXT STEGANOGRAPHY BASED ON THE PCCSNs
For a Chinese character, its PCCSN has one value: even or odd. So it can denote a binary digit. For example, when a stroke's number is even, it means ''0'', otherwise ''1'' for odd number of stroke. However, to represent an arbitrary BDS, it is required that the adjacent Chinese characters' PCCSN features in different texts must be nearly uniform distribution. The distribution of the PCCSN feature is thoughtfully analysed in a mathematical way and verified by experiments as follows.
A. CONVENTIONS & HYPOTHESES
First we present the symbol conventions and then the hypotheses are given.
1) THE SYMBOL CONVENTIONS
W : The set of all Chinese characters. C 0 : The number of Chinese characters with even strokes C 1 : The number of Chinese characters with odd strokes C w : The total number of all Chinese characters.
L bstring : The length of a secret BDS. L s : The length of a Chinese sentence. S: A Chinese sentence, which can be expressed as:
where w k (k = 1, 2, . . . , L s ) is the Chinese character at the kth position in a sentence S, and w k ∈ W . P(w k ): The occurrence probability of a Chinese character' appearing at the kth position in a sentence S. Then the probability of a sentence, i.e., P(S), is calculated as:
2) THE HYPOTHESES
To simplify the subsequent analysis, the following reasonable assumptions are made: Hypothesis 1: The length of a sentence S, i.e., L s , is equal to the length of its corresponding BDS.
Hypothesis 2: The Chinese texts satisfies N-grams model.
B. THE PCCSNs' DISTRIBUTION WHEN THE UNIGRAM MODEL EXISTS
The unigram model (i.e., 1-gram model) means that every Chinese character appears independently, that is, the probability of a character appearing at the kth position in a sentence is not affected by its predecessor or successor. In other words, the regular collocation has no impact on the probability of a character appearing at the kth position in a sentence statistically. A stroke number can only be odd or even. For a given BDS, whose length is L bstring , a text can be found to represent it as long as there are 2 L bstring texts whose length is not less than L bstring and whose PCCSN features are different from each other. The probability that a BDS has a corresponding text is calculated as follows: At each position, the probability that a character has an even stoke is calculated as P 0 = C 0 /C w , that is, the probability of the digit ''0'' is P 0 ; and similarly, the probability of the digit ''1'' is calculated as P 1 = C 1 /C w . Obviously, P 0 + P 1 = 1. The matching probability of the kth digit in a BDS to the PCCSN of the kth character in a text is given as:
So the probability of a sentence S matching with a BDS is calculated as:
It can be found that the probability that a BDS has an exact match for a text is equal to the probability of constructing a BDS by using ''0'' and ''1''. Therefore, the PCCSN feature is suitable for steganography proposed in this paper when the unigram model exists in Chinese.
C. THE PCCSNs' DISTRIBUTION WHEN THE N-GRAM MODEL EXISTS
The case above leaves the regular collocation in adjacent Chinese characters out of consideration. But the regular collocation does exist in many languages, e.g., English and Chinese. So such a phenomenon must be taken into consideration.
The following is the analysis of the case that the N-gram model exists in Chinese. In this case, the existence probability of a sentence composed of some Chinese characters is computed as: (6) where P(w k |w
) is the probability of a Chinese character's appearing at the kth position on condition that the N-1 characters are given. This probability of a Chinese character is different from each other, but the sum of the probabilities of all the characters at the kth position is 1. It is well known that there are many fixed collocations in Chinese, where some Chinese characters have an inherent adjacency. Namely, only a few Chinese characters will follow a given Chinese character to constitute a set phrase. So the occurrence probability of other characters is tiny or zero. Therefore, we can ignore the characters that barely appears, and only count the characters constantly in use. Herein, for a given character Wk, the number of Chinese characters following it with high probability is denoted by I , and they all come from the same set W, and their occurrence probability is denoted as P k1 , P k2 , P k3 , . . . , P kI , then I i=1 P ki = 1. As mentioned above, the probability of that each character has odd or even strokes is P 1 or P 0 , respectively. Then the probability of successfully matching a PCCSN with a binary digit at the kth position is calculated as:
It is obvious that this match probability at the kth position is equal to the probability in the unigram model. Namely, P n−gram (S) = P unigram (S). It is concluded that the PCCSN feature is suitable to represent a binary digit even when the regular collocation is taken into consideration. In summary, from the conclusion it is safe to say that the PCCSN feature can be employed for steganography.
D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINESE CHARACTERS
The previous analyses show that a sequence of PCCSNs is suitable for representing a BDS. This section will further verify the conclusion by experiment. The experiments are performed in the following five groups.
1) THE STATISTICS ON THE PARITIES OF THE COMMON CHINESE CHARACTERS' STROKE NUMBER
(1) For 2500 most common Chinese characters, the number of characters with odd and even strokes are 1215 and 1285, respectively, and their corresponding occupancy percentages are 48.6% and 51.4%, respectively.
(2) For other 1000 common Chinese characters, the number of characters with odd and even strokes are 531 and 469, respectively, and their proportions are 53.1% and 46.9%, respectively.
(3) After summing the above two results, the numbers of characters with odd and even strokes are 1764 and 1754, respectively. The proportion of characters with odd stokes to characters with even stokes is almost 1:1.
2) THE STATISTICS FOR THE REGULAR COLLOCATIONS THAT HAVE TWO CHARACTERS, THREE CHARACTERS, AND FOUR CHARACTERS ARE SHOWN IN TABLE 1-3, RESPECTIVELY
The first two lines in Tables 1-3 show the total occurrence number of ''0'' and ''1'', respectively; the third column shows the proportion of the last binary digit, that is, in the case that their prefix string is the same. (e.g. 0000 and 0001 in Table 3 , on the condition that the first three bits are ''000'', VOLUME 7, 2019 the occurrence probabilities of ''0'' and ''1'' in last bit are 59.3% and 40.7%, respectively).
3) THE STATISTICS FOR THE STROKE NUMBERS' PARITIES IN DIFFERENT TOPICS AND WITH DIFFERENT LENGTHS ARE SHOWN IN TABLE 4
In this experiment, the texts with different topics and different lengths include a total of 1.7 Million (M) characters.
The frequency count of characters in the dataset is calculated, and their PCCSNs following a given character are gathered. Table 4 shows that the PCCSNs' distributions are almost uniform in the vast majority of cases, except few cases where the parity appears a very value, which only occurs in few low-frequency characters. For those characters whose frequencies are above 0.00006%, i.e., who appear more than 100 times, only 0.0034% of their following characters have a very parity value, so such case is ignored.
4) MORE STATISTICS ON MORE DATA
To verify this conclusion, more statistical analyses are carried out considering about 17M characters in the news [27] and about 3M characters in the ''Four Great Classical Novels'' [28] .
For a given Chinese character, to compute the PNSCC distribution of the subsequent character, a ratio is defined as: where N odd and N even represent the number of the odd and even PCCSNs, respectively. Fig. 1 shows the proportion of the ratios calculated according to (8) . It only counts the stroke numbers of the characters that directly follow a given Chinese character. Only the characters whose use frequencies are more than 0.00006% are shown. It is found that the PCCSN distribution is in line with a binomial distribution, thus this feature has a good randomness and it is suitable for steganography.
5) STATISTICS ON THREE CONTIGUOUS CHARACTERS
We not only takes the first subsequent character into account as shown in Fig. 1 , but also study the second, third, and fourth subsequent Chinese character's PCCSN feature as depicted in Fig. 2 . Herein, only the 2M-character dataset is used. Fig. 2 only shows the characters whose use frequency is above 0.0005%, that is to say, who appear more than 400 times in the dataset.
Next, only the PCCSNs of three adjacent characters are further discussed, which can represent the eight BDSs, i.e., ''000''-''111''. Fig. 2b illustrates its distribution. Herein, the coefficient of variation is calculated as a ratio of the squared difference to the mean value based on the amount of those BDSs. It can be found that Chinese characters whose coefficient of variation is less than 0.6 are more than 83.74%. The smaller the value of coefficient of variation is, the more uniform the PCCSNs' distribution is. Namely, the above experiments show that the PCCSNs' distribution is uniform. Thus, three contiguous Chinese characters matched with an eight-length BDS can be found in a text. The result is basically consistent with the binomial distribution, which further verifies the foregoing mathematical analysis result in Section IIB-C. In addition, every character has the PCCSN feature. These reconfirm that the feature is suitable for representing a binary digit for text steganography. Definitely, there are some inept characters, which should be excluded to promote the concealment.
III. THE DESIGN OF STEGANOGRAPHY ALGORITHM
The proposed text steganography method is performed based on a large text corpus, and this corpus is shared by both senders and receivers. The corpus can be constructed based on a plenty of webpages on the Internet, which has rich text contents. It is often relatively difficult to match a long BDS with only one text. Practically, in order to improve the matching probability, a secret BDS usually needs to be segmented at first. This proposed method is a kind of steganography by search. Herein, the search process is implemented based on the corpus index tree. The overall procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
A. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CORPUS
As mentioned above, the corpus is composed of texts from the Internet. Every page is identified by a Uniform Resource Locator (URL). To improve the efficiency of matching a text with a BDS, the corpus is organized into a binary index tree. The structure of its index node is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
Herein, Lchild and Rchild fields point its left child node and right child node, respectively; Parent field connects its parent node; P_urls is the pointer to an array that stores URLs, one of which has a corresponding BDS, which will be explained later. The binary index tree is constructed as shown in Fig. 5 .
Where the whole depth of the index tree is denoted as L, which is the length of the longest text, and its maximal full binary subtree L BT . The root of such an index tree is a special node, in which its Parent and P_urls fields are null. The intermediate nodes must have its parent node, while their Lchild and/or Rchild fields might be null. The leaf nodes also have its parent node, but no child nodes, and their P_urls fields point to more than one valid URLs that usually points to different webpages with different topics.
Every edge in Fig. 5 can represent a binary digit ''0'' or ''1''. Herein, it is assumed that those edges pointing to left child nodes represent ''0'', and the others represent ''1''. Then a URL stored in the P_urls represents a BDS constructed according to edges along the path from the root node to the current node. The different URLs stored in the same nodes represent the same BDS.
A full corpus binary index tree can express any BDS whose length is no more than L BT , i.e., the height of the full index tree. L BT can indicate the size of its search space denoted as S search . In other words, this size reflects the corpus' ability of expression, that is, how many URLs are needed when a BDS is given. For an incomplete corpus binary index tree, the L BT is the height of a full subtree who has the same root node as the whole index tree.
B. CAPTURING TEXTS TO CONSTRUCT A CORPUS
For text steganography, the concealment of the proposed steganography is not only subject to steganography techniques but also closely related to the topic or content of its cover. When the meaning of a text is irrelevant to our secret and the text is employed as a cover to transmit the secret, the concealment will be significantly good. Therefore, a filter process is usually needed to enhance the security when a corpus is constructed for the covert transmission. The main procedure for constructing a text corpus is as follows:
First, choose suitable topics and keywords. The sender should pick up keywords for filtering texts according to some factors, such as the occupations of sender and receiver, their hobbies, the recent hot topics, and etc. At least, the selected keywords should not imply the meaning of the secret.
Second, capture webpages. A webpage can be grabbed by a crawler tool, parsed, and then saved as a plain text.
Third, filter these texts. Those texts including the similar meaning of the secret should be excluded at first. In order to ensure that the cover texts do not contain the meaning of the secret, the texts need to be screened according to the following filtering criteria:
Criterion 1: The maximum match length CL max . For a secret, CL max is the maximum length of its substring that matches a substring in a text. For steganography, a smaller CL max value indicates better concealment of a steganography system.
Criterion 2: The number of the characters in both the secret and a text is represented by W num . For steganography, the smaller the W num value is, the better the concealment of a steganography system is.
Fourth, build a text corpus with a binary index tree. Create a binary index tree as mentioned above, and save the qualified texts into the text corpus.
In general, a text corpus can be temporary or permanent. A temporary corpus is constructed instantly on demand and often used only once. By contrast, a permanent corpus is ready on the shelf and can be used constantly. Both of them have their own advantages. The former occupies less storage space; and the latter does not need to be constituted every time, which could reduce the process time. Generally speaking, a temporary corpus is relatively small, while a permanent corpus is large and informative. In both cases, the search space is subjected to the built corpus.
C. SEGMENTING A SECRET BINARY DIGIT STRING
As stated above, the PCCSN can be used to represent a binary digit. Thus, the first step for steganography is usually to transform a secret into a BDS. Many methods can be employed for this purpose, e.g., transforming it into UTF-8 code or doing encryption. Usually, the cryptographic operation is used to further improve the security. After transformation, L bstring is usually larger than the number of characters in a text denoted as L character , and in this case, no text can convey the secret. Even if L bstring ≤ L character , a large search space is still a must to ensure that there is a corresponding text, which is usually impractical. The above mathematical analyses reveal that the success rate is 100% for a L character text if and only if the PCCSN feature space is not less than 2 L . In other words, in order to express an arbitrary L bstring -length BDS, the number of texts in the search corpus should not be less than 2 L bstring . Therefore, if a secret BDS is too long, it should be segmented. Following are two proposed methods of segmentation.
Fixed Length Segmentation (FLS):
A BDS is segmented according to the size of the search space L BT . All but the last segment has the same size as L BT , and the last segment is usually no longer than L BT . The detail segmentation procedure is explained as follows: 1) Decide L BT . For a given corpus index tree, e.g. illustrated in Fig. 5 , the L BT can be easily determined according to the Breadth-First Search (BFS) algorithm. When a binary tree is traversed, the existence of its' two children nodes is checked. If two children exist, next node is checked; otherwise, stop and assign its depth to L BT .
2) Construct the secret header. In order to ensure that the receiver can extract the secret, the L bstring should be sent to the receiver. It is conveyed in the segmentation header field as shown in Fig. 6 . The length of the secret header L header is shared by two parties. Definitely, the condition L bstring ≤ 2 L header should exist, otherwise, the header will be extended to make the condition hold true.
3) Segment the complete secret BDS according to L BT . The secret header is in the L bstring /L BT . The segmentation result is shown in Fig. 6 .
Variable Length Segmentation (VLS):
A BDS is divided into many segments with different lengths. Segmentation criterion: take the maximum prefix of a secret BDS as a block, which corresponds to the longest path starting from the root node in the corpus index tree. The VLS method can improve the embedding efficiency. Herein, the embedding efficiency is indicated by the number of URLs sent in a communication. The lesser number corresponds to the higher embedding efficiency. The detail segmentation procedure is as follows:
1) Obtain the maximum prefix string. Match a path in the corpus index tree with the secret BDS until a node, denoted by N matching , has no edge to represent the corresponding binary digit in the secret BDS. Hence, the secret BDS is truncated into two parts: a prefix substring with most length matching a path in the corpus index tree, and the remainder. Thus the maximum prefix string can be represented by the path starting from the root node to N matching . The URLs stored in P_urls field in N matching represent the maximum prefix strings.
2) Determine the availability of N matching . If the P_urls in this node points to at least one URL, the node is available. Whereas if its P_urls is null or the stored URLs are invalid, the node is not available. At this point, its parent node is checked if its P_urls is null, and do this recursively until a node is reached, whose P_urls field has at least one valid URL.
3) Divide the secret BDS. When an available node N matching is got, the secret BDS is truncated into two parts: a maximum prefix substring matching a path in the corpus index tree, and the remainder. Now, the maximum prefix string is represented by any URL stored in the node N matching . 4) Repeat the above Operations 1-3 for the remainder BDS. The segmentation result is shown in Fig. 7 .
D. THE FIXED-LENGTH SEGMENT STEGANOGRAPHY ALGORITHM
Next, the procedure of the Fixed-Length Segment Steganography (FLSS) algorithm is delineated accordingly.
1) EMBEDDING PROCESS
Input: A secret message (i.e., msg). Output: A URL vector set. The operation procedure is defined in detail as follows: S1: Select a character feature. In this paper, the PCCSN is employed to represent a binary digit. Specifically, an odd number of the PCCSN represents ''1'' and an even number represents ''0''. S2: Capture texts to construct a corpus. A temporary corpus can be constructed according to the operations defined in Section III. If a permanent corpus is used, the corpus should be filtered as prescribed in Section III-B.
S3: Preprocess a secret message. The secret message is usually transformed into a secret BDS.
S4: Segment the secret BDS. The secret BDS is segmented according to the FLS process given in Section III-C.
S5: Compute the matched URLs. Match each segment in sequence with a path in the index tree, and find all URLs stored in the end node, then select one and put it into the URL vector.
S6: Repeat the above operations until every segment has a corresponding URL. Finally, a URL vector {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n } will be formed, where U 1 represents the BDS header.
S7: Share the URL vector with the receiver.
2) EXTRACTING PROCESS
Input: A URL vector set (i.e., {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n }).
Output: A secret message. E1: Save and verify the URLs. Save all URLs in the URL vector received from the sender in sequence, and check their validity by checking their existence and judging whether they belong to the same topic. To some extent, the check operation can detect whether the URL vector is tampered or attacked when being transferred.
E2: Acquire the texts from the webpages that the URLs point to. Use a crawler tool to get the webpages and extract the texts in them (skip this step if a permanent text corpus is used).
E3: Calculate the length of each segment. Read the first L header characters in the text pointed to by the first URL, and get the length of the secret BDS, i.e., L string . Then compute the length of the segments except the last one, i.e., L block and the length of the last segment, i.e., L lastblock according to the following two formulae, respectively.
L blastbloc = L string %N block (10) where N block is the number of URLs in the received URL vector from the sender. E4: Extract the binary digits to construct the secret BDS. Reading the first L block Chinese characters from the very beginning in each text except the one the last URL points to, and the first L lastblock characters from the text that the last URL points to; convert every character into a binary digit based on the PCCSN feature; and assemble these digits into a BDS in the order in which the corresponding character appears in the text and in which the texts corresponding to the URL appear in the URL vector. The BDS is the secret BDS.
E5: Decode the BDS. Decode the BDS to get the original secret message according to the preprocessing method at the sender. VOLUME 7, 2019 E. THE VARIABLE-LENGTH SEGMENT STEGANOGRAPHY ALGORITHM As introduced above, the FLSS algorithm is based on a full binary tree, and it is not a must that the P_urls fields in every node along the corresponding path point to at least one URL. What's more, a path can be used as long as it has a node below the L BT th layer has a P_urls field with at least one valid URL. A BDS segment can still be matched with one or more corresponding URLs as long as the P_urls in one node along the path is not null. However, the FLSS method may divide a secrete BDS into too many segments, which leads to a low embedding rate. To cope with this issue, a Variable-Length Segment Steganography (VLSS) method is proposed.
This VLSS method matches a given BDS with a path in the corpus index tree to find out the URLs that corresponds with the longest matched prefix string. The longest prefix string is regarded as a segment and one of the URLs is chosen as a cover. Repeat these operations on the remainder of the BDS. All the selected URLs are organized to a URL vector.
Different from the FLSS method, the node without any valid URL should not be the endpoint of a path in the VLSS method. That is, the VLSS method requires that every node along the path in the index tree must point to at least one URL. Otherwise, it needs a lot of webpages and makes the index tree difficult to be constructed. To easily construct such an index tree, only the nodes in the first L BT layers in the index tree must point to at least one valid URL, and if there is a node without no actual URL in first L BT layers, a generated URL is assigned to it to help indicate the corresponding BDS.
In general, the number of URLs used in the VLSS method, i.e., N variable , is less than N fixed , the number in the FLSS method. This analysis is based on the following two cases:
Although N variable isn't a determinate value, the length of each segment in VLSS is not less than L BT except the last one, and no header is needed.
The probability that a segment length is greater than L BT is calculated as follows:
Here, the depth of each layer below the L BT layer in the index tree is denoted as
and the number of nodes in the corresponding layer is represented as
, and L is the depth of the index tree as depicted in Fig. 5 .
Therefore, the probability that a node is selected is:
and the probability that a node is selected in a layer is: (12) and the length of the corresponding segment is L BT +i . For an index tree, the worst case is that each layer below the L BT layer has only one node. In this case, the probability that a node below the L BT layer is matched with the corresponding binary digit P min is computed as:
The optimum case is that there are 2 L BT +1 −1 − 1 nodes in the L BT + 1 layer, and all the sub-trees, which take these 2 L BT +1 −1 − 1 nodes as the subtree roots, respectively, are full binary trees and they have the same depths. In this case, the matching probability of the BDS P max is computed as:
Hence, the probability of a segment being longer than L BT is in [P min , P max ], and it rests on the number of nodes N BT +i . Since the length of every segment is not less than L BT , the number of segments will not be more than N fixed − 1.
Therefore, N variable ≤ N fixed − 1 holds true, and N variable is determined by the BDS and the index tree.
1) EMBEDDING PROCESS
Input: A secret message (i.e., msg). Output: A URL vector set. S1-3: It is similar to Step S1-S3 in the FLSS algorithm. S4: Segment the BDS and get the corresponding URLs. Find a node, whose corresponding path in the index tree matches the BDS as long as possible using VLS method introduced in Section III-C. URLs stored in the proper end node, denoted by N URL , can represent the maximum prefix of the BDS. And the path along from the root node to the node NURL represents the maximum prefix.
Record the maximum prefix and its corresponding URLs, and choose one of URLs, i.e., U i , based on some filters.
Repeat the above operations to construct the URL vector
Share the URL vector with the receiver.
2) EXTRACTING PROCESS
Input: A URL vector (i.e., {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n }).
Output: A secret message.
Ë1-2:
It is similar to Step E1-2 in the FLSS algorithm. Ë3: Extract the binary digits. Read all the Chinese characters in the texts pointed by the received URLs.
Convert these characters to the binary digits to form a BDS according to the PCCSN feature used in the originating side.
Concatenate these BDSs to form the complete secret BDS in the order of their corresponding URLs in the URL vector. 
Ë4:
Decode the complete secret BDS to get the original message according to on the originating encoding method.
F. THE IMPROVED ALGORITHM
In the previous two steganography methods, i.e., FLSS and VLSS methods, each Chinese character can only represent one bit, which leads to a low embedding capacity. Both methods are categorized as the Non-compound method. To improve the capacity, a compound structure unit (CSU) method is further proposed in the paper. Its main idea is to make each Chinese character represent more binary digits. Herein, a hidden unit is defined to match with a BDS as shown in Fig. 8 .
The flag x field marks the beginning of a hidden unit. It is not only closely related to the steganography capacity, but also has an important impact on the concealment. Its different definitions mean the different starting points of a hidden cell, which means a hidden unit is not predictable and it might be located at any position. This help to improve the concealment. Thus, the definition of the flag is very important.
With reference to the results of statistical experiments in Section II-B, the Chinese characters whose variation coefficients are less than 0.6 are chosen as flags because the PCCSNs of the subsequent characters are uniformly distributed. And these characters are formed into a flag table indicated by T .
The length of information field N is variable. Experiments in Section II-B counts three cases, i.e., 3, 4, and 5 consecutive Chinese characters. Since a BDS generated by encoding is usually multiples of 8, N = 4 is taken as an example to illustrate.
1) RULES FOR CONVERTING TEXTS TO BDSs
Different from the above two methods, the CSU method takes the prefix of a secret BDS to match a hidden unit. In order to simplify the match operation, the index tree should be reorganized based on the structure of the hidden unit. The specific procedures are detailed as follows:
1) For a cover text, find out all flags in it according to the flag table T .
2) Identify all corresponding hidden units according to the flags, and ignore the flags that cannot constitute a hidden unit;
3) Concatenate all the N-bit BDSs in all hidden unit in order, and get a complete BDS; 4) Create an index tree. As described above, the assumption is still that the edge to the left child represents ''0'', and the right means ''1''. First create a root node, and do with the complete BDSs to create children nodes to constitute a path based on the assumption. 5) Save the text's URL to P_urls field of the lowest child node. For example, in the first line in Fig. 9 , the characters in bold are in the flag table T , and the italic represent the ordinary characters. In the case that N = 4, the character D is both an information bit in the first hidden unit and a flag bit in the second hidden unit. Similarly, the characters E, F, G, and H are involved in three hidden units. Thus, a new text is generated, i.e., {B, C, D, E, E, F, G, H , F, G, H , I , G, H , I , J }. It is found that the length of the new text is longer than the original text, which can represent more bits.
The following two groups of examples compare these methods in inverse directions.
2) GROUP ONE: DIFFERENT TEXTS REPRESENTING THE SAME STRING
The texts in this example are taken from the corpus used in Section II-B, and those Chinese characters in bold are flags in Table T . The two examples show that the number of characters used in the improved method for the same secret BDS is cut down 45% and 52%, respectively as shown in Fig. 10 .
Group Two: Different BDSs represented by the same text. Fig. 11 indicate that the length of the BDSs represented by the same text were increased to 180% and 160% in two examples in the CSU method, respectively.
IV. ANALYSIS OF STEGANOGRAPHY ALGORITHMS A. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEALMENT
The proposed methods only use the existing webpages, don't generate or modify anything. Therefore, they can resist the format transformation attack, the semantic detection, and the statistical detection. Moreover, they have the following advantages:
1) The URLs are common. This method uses URLs to transmit a secret. A URL is the common resources on the Internet, which is in line with the features of the best carriers. 2) No additional information will be generated. Embedding and extracting processes do not generate any additional information or modify the covers.
3) They can be applied in short texts. The texts used in the existing coverless steganography method are usually long.
The above comparisons in Table 5 also show that a generation method is usually subject to the natural language processing technologies, and always cause poor readability when a long sentence is generated. The carriers in steganography by cover modification are often distorted, which make it easy to detect. Instead, the methods proposed in this paper uses URLs to transmit a secret, there will be no semantic anomalies and modification to the texts. Therefore, this method has an excellent concealment.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE EMBEDDING CAPACITY
As well known to all, the embedding capacity is an important criterion for evaluating a steganography method. In general, for a steganography method, its embedding capacity conflicts with its concealment. The embedding capacities of the existing methods by search are generally low. For example, the methods introduced in [21] , [26] can only hide one or a few Chinese characters in a text because a high concealment is required. But the proposed methods only employ the PCCSN feature, and the texts containing the meaning of a secret are excluded, so these methods do have no impact on the concealment when the embedding capacity are improved, e.g. the CSU method.
Theoretically, the proposed methods have a high embedding capacity. For the two non-compound methods, when the amount of Chinese characters in a text is no more than the length of the secret BDS, the embedding capacity will reach the maximum volume, i.e., L text bits, which is the number of characters in the text. In this case, the Traditional Embedding Rate, i.e., R TER reaches the maximum, R TER = 1/16 = 6.25%. But in the worst case, the embedding capacity might be the minimum value, i.e., 1 bit. For the improved method, the R TER depends on the size of the hidden units, which indicates the maximum use frequency of a character. For example, in the case that N = 4 in Fig. 8 , every character can be reused at most four times except the first N −1 and the last N − 1 characters, the whole text can represent a BDS whose length is at most four times than its length. At this time, the R TER can reach at most 4 * 6.25% = 25%. However, with the increasing of the number of segments of a secret BDS, the amount of texts required will increase exponentially to express any secret. Therefore, a secret BDS should be segmented to reduce the corpus' size, which will ensure the steganography success. Therefore, most of the time the R TER cannot reach the maximum. According to the comparison results shown in Table 7 in [29] , in the aspect of steganographic capacity, i.e., R TER , our proposed methods have an advantage over the previous methods except the RNN-Stega model. Similar to that the capacity of the RNN-Stega model depends on the length of the generated text, the capacities of our proposed methods depend on the size of the hidden units. The embedding rate of the RNN-stega model has an upper limit, although its maximum embedding rate can reach more than 20%; for our proposed model, its capacity can increase with the rise of the length of the hidden unit, e.g., its maximum embedding rate can at most reach 25% when the size of hidden units is 4, and the length of the hidden unit can be lengthened with no impact on the concealment.
Furthermore, it is the URLs that are transferred instead of texts. To put this in perspective, the New Embedding Rate, i.e., R NER can actually be recalculated according to:
where L URL is the length (in bit) of the URL for transferring the L bstring secret BDS. According to the statistics in [30] , the average length of URLs is about 77. It is also shown that top 10 sites in Google position all have shorter length than the average length [31] . Let L text is the length (in bit) of a web page, of which the average content length is at most 1890 words [31] , then L URL L text almost always exists. Therefore, R NER R TER almost always holds true.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE AVAILABILITY
These proposed methods are extendable in two aspects: 1) different features or their combinations can be employed; 2) it can also be extended to other languages, e.g., English. Many Chinese characters' features can be used in the proposed methods. For example: the starting stroke of Chinese characters, Chinese character strokes' components, the strokes in four corners of a Chinese character, and so on. The methods might apply in many languages. For example: the number of letters in English words, the number of syllables in English words, and etc.
The corpus' size has an important impact on the method's availability. The size of a corpus can not only be described by L BT , but also be expressed by the number of nodes located below the L BT layer, which is defined as its fullness.
(1) From the point of view of L BT . The efficiency of the FLSS method is proportional to L BT , that is, the larger L BT brings a higher steganography efficiency along with less use of URLs used. Also of note is that the efficiency of the VLSS method is not related to L BT .
(2) From the viewpoint of an index tree's fullness, the more the fullness of the index tree is, the higher the efficiency of steganography is, and the less the URLs are used. It should be noted that the FLSS method is not affected by the fullness of an index tree.
In summary, it can be concluded that a large scale of the corpus will prompt the availability of these methods. That is, a large-scale text corpus is significant for these steganography methods.
V. CONCLUSION
Steganography on the Internet is on the increase. In this paper, considering a large number of webpages and their rich texts, we proposed three coverless text steganography methods based on the PCCSN feature. Both the mathematical analysis and the experiments confirm that the PCCSN is uniformly distributed. And every character has this feature, so it is highly suitable for these steganography methods. These methods are implemented based on the corpus index tree, and the detail steganographic operations are introduced, specially to the segment operations. The analyses reveal these methods have advantages in several aspects, such as the good robustness, secure concealment, high embedding capacity, high success rate, and good extensibility, no contradict between the embedding capacity and the concealment in particular.
